Abstract Congress is considering proposals to improve its financing of long-term care. The key issue is whether it should support a social insurance program or a program targeted to a population group defined by income and assets. Social insurance is expensive, costing between $15 and $20 billion. For the most part, it provides benefits-primarily asset protection-to middle-and upper-income individuals. An improved Medicaid program, costing about $8 billion, benefits lower-income individuals but does not protect those with higher incomes. These two options cannot be viewed independently from trends in the private market. Sales of private long-term care policies have grown and between 30 percent and 40 percent of the elderly can be considered potential buyers. If private alternatives are available for those individuals who need asset protection, the case for a more targeted public approach-along with reliance on the private sector-becomes more compelling. Congress should consider a program that enhances Medicaid; improves consumer education; assists states in regulating long-term care policies, so as to enhance consumer protection and confidence; and clarifies taxes on long-term care insurance to encourage workers and the elderly to protect themselves against catastrophic expenses.
federal government and states through Medicaid, and over 50 percent is paid for by the recipients of care or their families (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1989).
Medicaid provides assistance to low-income individuals and families and is the major source of public funding for long-term nursing home care; it also finances a modest amount of home health care services. Medicaid covers care provided in skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, and psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals. Because Medicaid is state-financed, eligibility requirements and payment levels vary across states. While differences may in part reflect differentials in the cost of care, serious inequities across states exist.
In general, individuals without spouses are eligible for Medicaid upon admission to a nursing home if their assets (not counting a home) are less than $2,000 (Carpenter 1988) . If their assets exceed this amount, they must pay for care privately, presumably using both current income and assets, until assets are reduced below the eligibility level. This process of asset depletion is often called "spend-down." (Spend-down can also occur earlier, if an individual has high medical expenses before entering a nursing home). Somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of all individuals entering nursing homes spend down their assets to Medicaid eligibility thresholds (Liu et al. 1990 ; Spence and Wiener 1990a; Burwell et al. 1990; Rice 1989) .
In 1992, more than $60 billion will be spent on long-term nursing and home and community care for the elderly. While the burden for long-term care on states and individuals is heavy and rising continuously, for many reasons, the quality of nursing home and home health care services is thought to be inadequate. Medicaid reimbursement policies and the limited incomes of many aged individuals curtail payments, and the shortfall contributes to overall quality problems in the provision of long-term care.
The current means of financing long-term care-state Medicaid programs and individual out-of-pocket payments-leaves the middle-income elderly in a precarious financial position. They can pay out-of-pocket for services, make arrangements to receive care from families or friends, divest their assets to qualify for Medicaid, or go without the necessary care. Escalating costs, a bias in public financing toward institutional care, and access problems have led to an increasing demand for new approaches, both public and/or private.
Private financing could play a greater role because most individuals who enter nursing homes, the most costly long-term care service, are discharged within the first year of residency (Spence and Wiener 1990b) . Thus, although many people are at risk for long-term care services, only a few will incur a catastrophic expense. This makes the use of nursing home care suitable for risk pooling (insurance).
The confluence of these two factors-inadequate public financing of long-term care and the insurability of long-term care services-has led private insurers to enter the market in increasing numbers. There has been significant growth in the long-term care insurance market in the last five years: from fewer than 100,000 policies sold in 1986 to slightly fewer than 2 million policies sold by 1991 (Van Gelder and Johnson 1991) . About 5 percent of the elderly have purchased a policy. Moreover, activity in the employer-group market has been increasing steadily with a growing number of major firms committed to offering plans to employees as part of their benefit packages. By 1991, roughly 130,000 policies had been sold to employer groups (Van Gelder and Johnson 1991) . Although the market is growing, private insurance policies currently pay less than 1 percent of the nation's long-term care bill.
A comparison of policies offered today with those offered just a few years ago shows major improvements in design. Consumers now have the option of purchasing policies that include lifetime benefits, coverage for home health care, short deductible periods, and inflation protection. Also, there have been improvements on some of the more stringent underwriting restrictions that characterized first-generation policies. These changes represent the insurance industry's response to consumer preferences, regulatory initiatives, and competition.
Even in the presence of innovations, however, a number of researchers and industry observers have pointed out limitations in some of the policies offered in the market as well as certain industry weaknesses. They include the continued use of restrictive underwriting, the absence of guaranteed premium levels, the lack of affordable high-quality products, inadequate grievance redressal procedures if policyholders disagree with an insurer's determination, high administrative costs, sales agents who misrepresent policies, and the lack of protection against insurer solvency (Consumer Reports 1988 Reports , 1991 Wiener and Harris 1989 ; U.S. General Accounting Office 1989; Polniaszek and Firman 1991) . Thus, while there are inadequacies in public financing of long-term care, private market financing also continues to suffer from a number of important shortcomings.
Proposals for Changing Long-Term Care Financing
For a private financing system to "spring up" to fill the gaps in public sector financing is not unusual. Private and public programs have together successfully addressed a number of social welfare concerns like retirement income security and disability protection. The same is true of the financing of acute care services for the elderly: Medigap policies are designed to supplement coverage provided by the Medicare program.
The history of social welfare programs in this country, as well as the particular interests of the private and public sector, strongly suggests that, over time, long-term care services will be financed by a mix of public and private programs. For reasons of cost and policy, the government is unlikely to pay for all long-term care services demanded by all individuals. However, the financing role taken by the public sector will, in effect, prescribe what activities or population groups remain for the private sector to serve. Also, developments in the private sector influence the financing role assumed by the public sector. One reason why the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was repealed was that most consumers already had coverage for many of the benefits through their Medigap policies (Rice et al. 1991) . Thus, there is a dynamic between the two sectors, with each influencing the shape of the other.
In defining the roles of the public and private sectors, it is important to account for the underlying societal values on which there is a consensus as well as the political and financial feasibility of alternative partnerships. Much of the current debate in Congress centers on the issue of whether the government should change its role in financing long-term care or change its approach to regulating the insurance industry. Recent public discussion is focused on more effective regulation of the industry (Long-Term Care Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ; Consumer Protection Standards for Long-Term Care Insurance Act of 1991; Long-Term Care Insurance Improvement and Accountability Act of 1992). This follows debate over the past few years on numerous proposals and bills introduced to address the long-term care financing problem (Long-Term Care Assistance Act of 1988; Lifecare Long-Term Care Protection Act of 1988; Medicare Long-Term Care Catastrophic Protection Act of 1988; Retiree Health Protection and Long-Term Care Insurance Act of 1989).
The myriad and divergent legislative proposals are evidence that a consensus on the public role has not yet emerged. In general, proposals fall into three major categories: (1) some form of social insurance; (2) stimulation of the private market through tax clarifications, subsidies, and education; and (3) a targeted public approach building upon the Medicaid program. The presumption is that regardless of the choice made, the private sector will continue to play some role in long-term care financing.
A basic difference among the proposals is whether the private sector role will be large or small. In part, this depends on one's view of the role of public programs in long-term care financing. One view holds that government must take the lead in solving this social problem and leave the private sector to fill in small gaps, such as is now the case with acute health care for the aged-Medicare with Medigap policies. This view is based on the hypothesis that, primarily for reasons of cost, adequate private insurance coverage is not likely to be purchased by many people; therefore, the government should provide public coverage. Another view is that, while affordable, private insurance will not go very far toward solving the problem, because of attitudinal and information deficiencies in the marketplace. As a result, the government should take an active role in promoting private insurance so as to hasten the development of the market, restore efficiency where necessary, and ensure that efficient outcomes are judged equitable and appropriate, given society's values. The first position sees the role of government as dominant because of the failure of the private sector. The second position sees market failure as a reason for the government to promote private insurance.
Assessing a PublidPrivate Mix
To assess what mix of public and private long-term care financing would be best, it is important to determine what each sector can do as well as to evaluate what each sector should do. Our purpose in this paper is to report on the results of an analysis completed by us for the Health Insurance Association of America (1991) . An important objective of our analysis was to evaluate the financial and distributional impacts of selected public initiatives in long-term care financing and estimate their influence on the growth of the private insurance market. We present an analysis of the impacts of a social insurance program that provides back-end catastrophic protection (where the individual is responsible for the costs of the first two years of care and the program will pay thereafter); a social insurance program that pays first-dollar coverage for a limited period of time (where the program will pay for the first year of nursing home care and the individual is responsible for costs thereafter); an improved Medicaid program; and a program that subsidizes the purchase of long-term care insurance. We also explore the issue of whether or not private insurance can represent a viable financing alternative and for whom. Finally, we assess the implications of key study findings for the development of public policy in the long-term care financing area. Our underlying assumption is that private and public financing for long-term care will exist side by side for the foreseeable future and that what happens in one market will influence developments in the other. Moreover, should the government decide to do so, it can take an active part in enlarging the role of the private sector. We begin with a discussion of the potential size of the long-term care insurance market, in order to gauge the possible role that can be played by private insurance.
The Market for LongTerm Care Insurance

Affordability and Demand
A key issue is whether most of the elderly can afford long-term care insurance. Much has been written recently about the affordability of long-term care insurance; some of the more publicized modeling results show that it is within the reach of less than 20 percent of today's elderly (Rivlin and Wiener 1988; Friedland 1990; Ball and Bethel1 1989) . Even though the definitions of affordability and demand in these studies vary, they are all expressed solely in terms of "ability to pay." However, as with other products, people base their purchase of long-term care insurance on its perceived value relative to cost. If long-term care insurance is perceived as a good buy, then more people will purchase policies. Thus, using affordability by itself to estimate market size is inadequate: being able to afford something and deciding to purchase it are two distinctly different concepts. If this same methodology were applied to Medicare supplemental policies (Medigap), it would predict that the elderly purchase such policies far less frequently than they currently do. About 70 percent of the elderly have Medigap coverage, and most pay for these policies out-of-pocket; the average cost of these policies for a sixty-five-year-old is between $60 and $70 per month (Scheffler 1989) . The average cost of long-term care insurance policies that are currently selling in the market is between $90 and $110 for the group aged sixty-five to seventy-four. This group comprises 60 percent of all elderly and 76 percent of all long-term care insurance purchasers over the age of sixty-five (Cohen et al. 1992a ). Thus, the average difference between the two policy types that are selling is less than $40 per month. It seems unreasonable to assume that this difference accounts for the perceived " inaffordability " of long-term care insurance.
The potential market for long-term care insurance can be described as the "demand" for insurance at "market maturity" and is something extremely difficult to predict. Demand is a function of many factors, in-cluding the income and assets of potential consumers, their tastes and attitudes, their perspectives on risk, the price of the product, and the availability of substitute and complementary products. Thus, while price is one factor underlying the demand for long-term care insurance, it clearly is not the only one nor may it be the most important one.
Developing Purchase Criteria
There is little information on the extent to which perceived risks, costs, attitudes toward insurance, or other factors influence people to buy longterm care insurance. In the absence of empirical data, one can improve on current estimates of market size by defining criteria for purchase that take into account some of the factors likely to affect the interest people might have in buying insurance. In part, interest is related to the purposes for which they seek coverage, the cost of insurance, and the availability of alternative financing sources like Medicaid. To generate purchase criteria for long-term care insurance we interviewed executives and marketing personnel in a number of companies selling such insurance. The criteria represent the subjective evaluations of industry personnel about the income and asset profile of potential long-term care insurance buyers. They should probably be viewed as upper-bound estimates; moreover, until empirical data are forthcoming, the purchase criteria presented here should be viewed with caution.
Because long-term care insurance does, for the most part, protect assets, we hypothesized that someone interested in purchasing a policy would have a minimum of liquid assets, say $15,000. That is, for the policy to be judged as worthwhile, it would have to protect some minimum level of assets. Moreover, we presumed that to be considered a potential purchaser, someone with a modest to low income level would have to have a very high level of assets; alternatively, someone with a low level of assets would have to have a very high income level to be considered a potential purchaser.
Tastes and attitudes are likely to change with age. Therefore, the type of coverage purchased by an older person is likely to be different from the coverage he or she would have purchased at a younger age. In fact, recent data show that among current purchasers, individuals aged sixty-five to seventy-four, who comprise roughly 76 percent of the market over the age of sixty-five, are more likely than those over the age of seventy-five to choose longer benefit durations (five years versus four years), higher benefit amounts ($71 versus $65), shorter deductibles (thirty days versus 
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Note. The criteria are derived from subjective assessments of insurance industry personnel, based on their own knowledge and experience about the profile of purchasers and the potential marketing prospects for long-term care insurance. Income and asset level determinations attempt to take into account the premium costs of policies selling in the market, the presence of Medicaid, and the need for the policy to protect a minimum level of assets for it to be worthwhile to the purchaser. No explicit assumptions were made regarding the potential use or nonuse of liquid assets to help finance the purchase of insurance.
Source. Health Insurance Association of America 1991.
ninety days), and inflation protection (35 percent versus 17 percent); and they are also likely to pay much lower average premiums ($90 compared to $145) (Cohen et al. 1992a) . Thus, purchase criteria should also vary by age. Given these policy configurations, most policyholders chosen at random will not exhaust benefits; less than 20 percent of all elderly spend a total of more than three years in a nursing home over their lifetime (Murtuagh et al. 1990; Spence and Wiener 1990b) . However, because most policyholders have not chosen inflation protection, the proportion of long-term care costs paid by the policies will decline over time.
A final assumption behind the development of purchase criteria is that in the presence of a Medicaid program, insurance for low-income individuals would not make much sense; most of their long-term care costs would be reimbursed by Medicaid after their few remaining assets had been spent on care. Table 1 summarizes the income and asset profile of individuals "in the market" for long-term care insurance. Again, purchase criteria represent the subjective assessment of insurance industry personnel, taking into account the costs of policies selling in the market, the purposes for which individuals buy policies, and the presence of Medicaid.
Slightly more than 50 percent of individuals over the age of sixty-five can, on the basis of income and assets alone, be considered potential long-term care insurance purchasers. Table 2 shows the potential cornbined market size when health status (that is, people's ability to perform activities of daily living) is also taken into account.
Slightly more than 40 percent of all of today's elderly may be considered potential buyers of long-term care insurance. If the criteria used by companies to underwrite individuals exclude those with limitations in certain "instrumental" activities of daily living (e.g., mobility outside, dealing with finances, etc.), then the figure may be closer to 30 percent.
Currently, the private sector could help a sizeable proportion of the population of "young elderly" (i-e., those under the age of seventyfive) and working-age people to insure against long-term care costs. In the future, this proportion may grow. Estimates from the Brookings-ICF Long-Term Care Financing Model indicate that, by the year 2018, insurance may be affordable for between 25 percent and 54 percent of those aged sixty-five and older (Wiener and Harris 1990) . Thus, the upper bound on affordability may actually increase. However, private insurance is not likely to represent a viable solution for most individuals over the age of eighty. Premiums are likely to be too high and underwriting criteria so strict that they would keep most of them from purchasing policies. Private long-term care insurance offers younger, healthy old people and those of working age a chance to arrange protection for themselves for the years when private alternatives would otherwise be out of reach.
The decision to purchase insurance is based on both financial factors While the number of individuals insured by private insurance companies will continue to grow, the proportion of the population covered by private insurance is likely to remain far below the percentage that could afford to pay for insurance. Rather than price and income alone, attitudes toward insurance, the relative newness and inadequacies of some products, confused signals from the public sector, and a lack of information contribute to explaining the current low demand for private insurance (Cohen et al. 1992a ). Unless and until the government clearly defines its own role in this area, most consumers will be reluctant to purchase private insurance. Thus, if the government wishes to make private long-term care insurance more acceptable to the public and encourage individuals to protect themselves, it can do so by a number of methods including designing programs to increase the public's awareness of the costs and financing of long-term care, thus altering its perceptions about the value of private insurance; making private insurance less costly; and developing effective strategies for regulating the industry, so that consumers are confident that they are receiving high-value products from companies that are financially sound.
Evaluating Approaches and Impacts
Clearly, what the private sector can do is influenced by what the public sector does. What then, should the government role be in financing longterm care? The range of proposals indicated above underscores the lack of agreement among policy makers on the appropriate function of government. Even so, there is general agreement on a number of elements. It is commonly agreed that primary goals include the provision of an adequate level of quality care for the lowest possible cost and the equitable availability of care for those who need it.
How these goals are best met is the subject of much debate. Presented in Table 3 are a number of criteria for evaluating programs designed to solve the long-term care financing problem. For any program configuration, trade-offs between objectives and the underlying values they represent have to be made. For example, a program structured to pay for catastrophic expenses, i.e., long-stay nursing home care, may alter the mix of services away from home and community-based care toward institutional care. Or a program that pays primarily for home health care may do little to protect families against catastrophic nursing home expenses. Our analysis focuses on the financial costs and benefits of long-term care initiatives. We do not address the nonfinancial criteria presented in Table 3 in this paper, though they also merit attention. For, as the public sector wrestles with weighing and valuing different objectives and attempts to determine its role in long-term care financing, a fundamental issue arises: Who should be the primary beneficiaries of additional federal and state spending for long-term care and how should they benefit? The answers to such questions reveal whether resources required to finance new initiatives in long-term care are targeted to the appropriate groups. Moreover, a focus on who benefits and by how much also brings to the fore issues of equity, a traditional concern to government. Finally, long-term care financing must be viewed in the wider context of other governmental programs: federal dollars spent on long-term care for some groups represent dollars that are not spent elsewhere on other groups. Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 present summaries of our analysis of the costs (in 1990 dollars) and benefits of four alternative public approaches to financing long-term care. These include a program that provides "backend" catastrophic protection, a program that pays " first-dollar" coverage, a program that subsidizes the purchase of private long-term care insurance, and a targeted public program (e. g . , one that improves the Medicaid program).
The back-end catastrophic protection program pays 80 percent of nurs-ing home costs after a two-year deductible and 80 percent of home care costs after an annual $500 deductible. The first-dollar coverage approach pays nursing home costs for the first year that an individual is in a nursing home and lifetime home health care benefits. In both programs, eligibility for home care is a function of one's ability to perform activities of daily living (bathing , dressing, toileting , transferring, continence, and feeding).
An individual who is unable to perform two of six such activities is eligible to receive public benefits. Average nursing home costs are assumed to be $70 per day. We also assume that in the presence of this public coverage, individuals who require services will consume 30 percent more care than they would in the absence of the programs. The Medicaid reform that we have modeled would increase asset eligibility thresholds from $2,000 to $12,000 for nursing home care, expand home health care benefits for the functionally disabled poor and near-poor elderly,' and increase the personal needs allowance from $50 per month to $75 per month. The tax subsidy modeled pays 50 percent of the premium for purchasers with incomes less than $15,000 and 25 percent of the premium for purchasers with incomes between $15,000 and $29,999.
The Rationale Underlying the Model
The five submodels that we have used to generate estimates are described in detail in a report submitted by LifePlans to the Health Insurance Association of America in 1990. The models estimate utilization of long-term care services and demand for private insurance in the context of a changing public policy environment. Its key assumptions are based on the economic theory of risk and on principles of life table analysis. The models assume that there are interactions between the public and private markets, so that the impacts of public initiatives are not made in a completely static context.
In the private insurance market submodel, individuals in different income and asset groups assess the value of insurance relative to its price. The decision to purchase insurance is based on a comparison of the costs (including the costs of risk) with insurance and without insurance. Even within a single income and asset group the behavior of individuals will differ, because of factors like taste and aversion to risk. Costs with and The proportion of a group that buys insurance is affected by the coverage of the policy, the premium, the degree of aversion to risk among its members, and the fact that insurance is available. Public policies can affect the purchase decision either by reducing the risk faced by individuals and, hence, their insurance premiums, or by affecting attitudes toward long-term care insurance and its value. Three submodels are used to estimate the distribution of long-term care costs across each of forty different groups of individuals that are differentiated by age, sex, and income.' We use a prevalence-based model to estimate the costs of nursing home and home health care for individuals over varying time periods; an incidence-based model to estimate the annual and lifetime risk for needing long-term care, so that the number of service users can be projected; and data on length of stay to estimate the expected annual liability for individual long-term care users as well 2. There are few available data on the distribution of long-term care expenditures by income group. Data do suggest that wealthier individuals may be less likely to use nursing homes and more likely to use home care than poor individuals. Moreover, there is a clear relationship between age and income. The older one is, the greater the probability of being in a low-income group. Because individuals who require nursing home care or home health care are likely to be in their late seventies and early eighties they are somewhat more likely to have low incomes. We make a modest assumption that on an age-adjusted basis, individuals with incomes over $30,000 use 95 percent of the average for long-term care services, whereas those earning less than $10,000 use 105 percent of the average. Public programs that provide social insurance for either first-dollar or back-end long-term care costs would be expensive. Depending on a program's configuration, the additional public costs would be between $15-20 billion. These programs provide nursing home benefits primarily to middle and upper income individuals, many of whom can afford to purchase private insurance. However, such programs would provide few additional benefits to individuals who enter nursing homes and have no alternative financing mechanisms available to them, because the Medicaid program already pays for their nursing home costs. Clearly these social insurance approaches could assist the spouse of a person using long-term care services to remain self-supporting. However, they would also place the government in the position of collecting tax dollars, which are likely to be financed in large part by the nonelderly, to help individuals entering nursing homes to protect assets and assure an estate.
Most of the costs of these programs would be for nursing home care. However, the first-dollar coverage approach (similar to that proposed by Senator Kennedy) contains substantial home health care benefits. Backend catastrophic protection (similar to that proposed by Senator Mitchell) would also cover home care but on a less comprehensive basis. Many of these benefits would accrue to the low-income elderly, because a disproportionate share of disabled elderly in the community have low incomes (Rowland 1990 ). To some degree benefits from such a program would replace the dollars that Medicaid currently spends on home health carewhich total about 14 percent of all home care costs (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1989) . Even so, most of the additional benefits of home care coverage would accrue to the low-income population, which is one of the program's major strengths.
The Medicaid reform described above would be less costly (about $8 billion) and targets low-income groups. Moreover, it would substantially reduce the number of individuals spending down all of their assets to be eligible for Medicaid (Cohen et al. 1992b) . Such a program would enable lower-middle-and lower-income nursing home residents to protect more of their assets, which could be used in the transition from a nursing home back to the community or to leave a modest estate. This approach would also help redress the bias in Medicaid that favors institutional care by expanding home care eligibility and would distribute the benefits to individuals who currently have no alternative financing sources, such as private insurance.
A premium subsidy for low-and moderate-income groups for the purchase of insurance would have only a modest short-run effect on the number of policies purchased, essentially because the level of current demand is so low. Moreover, it would be extremely expensive-about $860 per additional person insured. Over a longer period of time, the government action that could most significantly raise the demand for private insurance is the adoption of public policies that improve people's attitudes toward insurance and increase their awareness of the need for long-term care protection.
A Practical Public/Private Mix
The most important task facing policymakers today is to define the boundaries of public and private activity in long-term care financing. Recent events indicate that, regardless of political orientation, governments are rethinking and redefining what their role in the management of the general economy should be, in particular, in those sectors of the economy dealing with welfare issues. The worldwide trend towards mixed marketand government-based solutions reflects, in part, the restrictiveness and rigidity that often plague government management and the inequities that result from totally private solutions. The debate on the public/private roles in long-term care cannot be immune from this scrutiny.
When the U.S. Congress first began to recognize the long-term care financing problem in the late 1970s, the options for federal financing of long-term care costs included social insurance, increased support for Medicaid enhancements, and categorical grants. At that time, there were almost no private insurance plans for long-term care and the private sector had not shown an inclination to enter the market. Hence, a strong rationale for public financing was the absence of a private market.
Recent trends in insurance policy sales do suggest, however, that the assumption of "market failure" may be premature. Yet the number of individuals with policies is still far below the number of individuals who could afford to purchase them. In part, this reflects a failure of information (Bowman 1991) . The presence of knowledgeable consumers is a necessary condition for the development of an efficient private insurance market. However, many individuals do not understand their exposure to catastrophic long-term care costs. Also, it is difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to fully appreciate the value or inadequacies of insurance plans. Even so, information problems are not necessarily permanent and do not on their own require substantial changes in the government's financing role. The logical solution to this problem is a very specific form of government intervention: education and more effective consumer protection regulation.
The presence of current inefficiencies in the market for long-term care insurance is also a function of the fact that the industry is still emerging. Yet even an efficient private market may lead to social outcomes that are deemed unacceptable. There is a clear history of government involvement in social welfare and health concerns when efficient private market solutions lead to undesirable social outcomes.
Private long-term care insurance is not likely to present a solution for low-income elderly as well as the elderly who are over age seventy-five, who are presently at high risk for incurring catastrophic long-term care costs. Thus, expansions in public financing are needed. The key issue for the public sector is whether the cornerstone should be a program targeted to a select population group defined by income and assets or a social insurance program.
There are many advantages to a social insurance approach: maintaining equity in access to benefits; a broad sharing of long-term care expenses; coverage for all individuals, without regard to current health status; reduced administrative expenses, resulting in a greater proportion of the premium charged to the public (i.e., taxes) allocated to benefit payments; and, once implemented, the likelihood of broad public support.
A targeted public program (e.g. ? improved Medicaid) also offers some important advantages. Aside from the substantial difference in program cost-which makes this approach more politically feasible-an improved Medicaid also ensures equitable access to benefits, by covering all individuals without regard to current health status. Such an approach also allows somewhat greater flexibility in program design across statesanother potential problem area-than does a uniform social insurance program. A major difference is that it establishes a very different policy with regard to asset protection: a Medicaid reform strategy protects fewer people's assets, whereas a social insurance program would protect everyone's assets and pay for the care of all individuals.
These two options cannot, however, be viewed independently from trends occurring in the private market. A social insurance program may, in part, be justified if only a small percentage of individuals can afford private insurance. Currently, about two in five elderly can afford to purchase private insurance and over time this number may grow, especially if more working-age individuals begin to purchase policies. Thus, if private alternatives are available to those individuals for whom social insurance benefits are most likely to serve the purpose of asset protection, the case for a more targeted public approach becomes more compelling.
General Components of a Plan for the 1990s
Suppose the goals of the government in 1992 are to provide more equitable access to care, reduce the number of individuals spending down to Medicaid eligibility levels, expand home health care coverage, and encourage people to protect their assets by buying private insurance. To meet these objectives, a public program should include the following elements:
(1) Enhanced Medicaid: Liberalize the Medicaid program as modeled above, so as to help solve the problems faced by those who cannot protect themselves against catastrophic long-term care expenses because either their health status or their income/asset profile prevents it. In addition, the federal government should work with states to minimize interstate inequities in payment levels that do not reflect differences in input costs.
(2) Public Education and Regulation: Support an educational program that clarifies public coverage and the risks and payment sources for long-term care; also, assist states in the regulation of long-term care policies and marketing practices, so as to enhance consumer protection.
(3) Tax Law Changes: Provide incentives like tax clarifications (e.g., defining long-term care as a health benefit and treating long-term care benefits with tax-favored status) to encourage the elderly as well as the working population to protect themselves against catastrophic long-term care expenses.
The three-part program contemplated is straightforward in intent. The government would define its role clearly and distinguish its long-term care programs and services from what is provided by the private sector. Whereas all long-stay nursing home patients would receive benefits through a more humane Medicaid program, the government would look to the private sector to provide asset protection and risk pooling for those who can afford to purchase private insurance. For the less wealthy elderly, an improved Medicaid program offers real benefits-asset protection and additional home care benefits. Finally, a renewed federal effort at minimizing interstate differences in payment levels (differences not explained by variance in input costs) would reduce inequities in the existing program.
An insurance subsidy through tax clarification, as well as educational efforts and a federal-state partnership on consumer protection strategies, would send a strong signal that the government sees a meaningful role for the private sector and let more well-off or relatively young consumers know that they face a risk that can be covered by private insurance.
The costs of these changes is estimated to be no more than $10 billion (in 1990 dollars). The Medicaid reform would cost $7.7 billion, of which $4 billion would be spent on expansions of home care benefits. A preliminary range for the tax clarifications proposed, along with increased federal efforts in education and regulation, is $1-2 billion.
Because public resources are limited, a blend of public and private financing offers the most viable solution to the long-term care problem. However, financing alone will not improve the quality of long-term care. Additional federal and state regulatory standards for nursing and home care are needed. The success or failure of this publidprivate mix depends in part on how clearly consumers understand the roles played by each sector. Only the government can communicate the delineation of roles. Moreover, the insurance industry must respond to the challenge by offering policies that incorporate adequate consumer protection features, such as inflation protection and opportunities to recoup premiums paid if a policy is dropped or long-term care benefits never used. Published quarterly in March, June, September, and December.
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